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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CIA TRAINING PROGRAM

August 1960



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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CIA TRAINING PROGRAM

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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. This study was initiated at the request of the DDCI to determine the nature and extent of the Agency's training effort and to evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the Agency's present and future needs. It should be noted that this is an Agency-wide functional study and is not intended to be a formal inspection of the Office of Training. Problems of organization and management, processes and procedures or administration are not dealt with in this report unless they have significant bearing on training objectives.

2. All formal training programs and facilities in headquarters were examined [REDACTED]

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past two years and further consideration of that problem is not deemed pertinent to this report.

3. Evaluation of the effectiveness of Agency training was obtained through interviews with operations officers recently returned from overseas duty, students currently enrolled in training courses, present and former Junior Officer Trainees, supervisors of employees with technical skills acquired through Agency training and with more than 100 senior officers in the Clandestine Services and elsewhere in headquarters. Evaluation also took into consideration the substantive content of training courses in relation to the needs of an intelligence service, the

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duration of training periods and level of instruction, the qualifications and experience of instructors and the relationship of training to career planning and development.

4. The Agency's training effort also has been studied in comparison with the programs of other government agencies particularly that of the Foreign Service. Some industrial programs have been weighed as well to provide some background for an evaluation of the Agency's approach to induction, basic and advanced preparatory training.

5. In total the following pages present a comprehensive view of all of the activities currently engaged in for the preparation of people to do the work expected of them by the Agency. The final section of the report attempts to project intelligence training needs into the future and suggests a program that will achieve the desired objectives.

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II. ADMINISTRATION OF AGENCY TRAINING

A. Legal Authority

1. The Agency's legal authority to provide training for its employees at public expense is granted by the Government Employees Training Act (P.L. 85-507; 72 Stat. 329), enacted in 1958. By Executive Order 10,805, dated April 30, 1959, the President designated the Agency as excepted from various specific provisions of the Act referring chiefly to the responsibility of the U.S. Civil Service Commission for the promotion, coordination, review, etc., of the training programs and operations provided for by the Act. Prior to the enactment of the 1958 Act, the Agency's authority for training activities was section 4 of the CIA Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 208), which section was repealed by the 1958 Act.

2. The chief provisions of the 1958 Act applying to the Agency may be summarized as follows: Congress declared its policy to be that "self-education, self-improvement and self-training" by Government employees "be supplemented and extended by Government-sponsored programs for the training of such employees in the performance of official duties and for the development of necessary skills and knowledge and that such programs should be designed to lead to improved public service, dollar savings, and the building and retention of a permanent cadre of skilled and efficient Government employees, well abreast of scientific, professional, technical, and management development both in and out of Government." The Act then proceeds to direct the head of each department to place in effect a program for the training of employees in such

department by, in and through Government facilities and non-Government facilities, and authorizes the head of each department to pay the salary of employees under his jurisdiction during the period of training as well as the expenses of such training. It is directed that each such program shall provide for the encouragement of self-training. The Act requires each department head to "conduct and complete a review of the needs and requirements of such department for the training of employees under its jurisdiction" at least once every three years. This report constitutes such a review.

3. The source of authority for all training administered by the Agency to persons who are not employees is section 8.B. of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (P.L. 81-110).

B. Scope of Present Program

1. CIA's training effort has been characterized by early years of extremely rapid growth, followed by consolidation of programs and the slow evolution of a general philosophy in the operating offices on the place of training in intelligence. The achievements thus far with respect to induction training have been substantial. Integrated training programs are today provided to the great majority of the Agency's new employees as a matter of policy. In 1960, for the first time, recruitment and training of professional officers for the DD/P and to meet about one-fourth of the similar requirements of the DD/I and DD/S are to be accomplished through the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP). Training programs for clerical and semi-professional employees have been solidly established for much longer periods of

time. Basic general training for these categories has been undertaken by the Office of Training. Where special skills have been involved the training most frequently has been administered by the component concerned or arranged externally.

2. Training objectives and programs have varied considerably among the Directorates of the Agency. The DD/S with its many specialized assignments has tended towards local training programs, as for example in the Offices of Communications and Logistics. The DD/I in light of its requirement for specialists in both social and physical sciences has been oriented towards external training and to date has preferred to hire individuals previously trained and requiring no extensive further investment on the part of the Agency. 25X1
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3. Taken as a whole, CIA training does not yet reach extensively nor systematically into the area of advanced training of career employees. To an important degree training is a derivative of organizational policy in the broad field of personnel management and since the Agency has not yet reached a consensus on the place of such tools as job standards, rotation, competitive evaluation, mid-career training, senior executive training and sabbaticals, there is no obvious and self-evident career training pattern instilled in the minds of either the Agency's staff

employees or its managers.

4. The absence of a general conviction on the place of training in career development is also explained by the fact that the first generation of intelligence officers acquired their skills and know-how on the job and with minimum exposure to formal training. Their integration into a training system has been and is apt to remain on a catch-as-catch-can basis pending the evolution of the stronger personnel management tools referred to above.

5. The subordination of the Office of Training to the DD/S has ✓ also materially limited the power of the Director of Training to develop and to control unified Agency training policy. There has been considerable growth over the years in OTR responsibility to undertake Agency-wide coordination of training but little augmentation of its power to enforce a common policy. Security, compartmentation, and diversity of program have perhaps made it inevitable from the beginning that the component offices would retain as local prerogative training responsibilities which in other organizations are more customarily concentrated in a single authority and clothed with the power of the senior command.

C. Cost

1. The Office of Training has recently assembled figures on the cost of training in CIA which are incomplete in some respects but represent the best information available at the present time. The subject is complex and its measurement requires various arbitrary decisions with respect to:

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- a. Separation of capital investment from operating costs in training programs.
- b. Allocation of cost to training where a facility has multiple uses and its personnel have other responsibilities in addition to training.
- c. Allocation of cost to training where the trainee is moving from apprentice to journeyman status and his efforts are increasingly productive in character.

The enumeration of major categories of CIA training and their costs in FY 59 is as follows:

Office of Training



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2. The list omits outlays for instructors, equipment, and facilities providing both formal courses and on-the-job training in six offices or staffs of the DD/S, five offices of the DD/I and three elements of the DD/P.

3. The cost of Training Officers is not included. One or more individuals are assigned in each major component of the Agency, usually part-time, to develop and process training requirements and to conduct liaison with OTR. There is an additional investment in clerical support for most of these officers.

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5. The figures include student salaries in the case of JOT's who are assigned to OTR during their first two years with the Agency. However, eighteen months of this two-year period, on the average, are spent on the job in increasingly productive assignments. Salaries of all other trainees are not included.

6. A rough indicator of total cost of student participation in Agency training programs can be obtained by application of the now

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7. The Agency obviously has it within its power to alter present proportions between formal and on-the-job training so that employee departures from duty for purposes of training will be substantially reduced and instructor, facility and student salary costs thereby curtailed. On the other hand, the purpose of training is to make an investment in the employee which will yield an increase in productivity and thereby recoup the initial investment and more. The Agency may well look forward to training economies through consolidation of facilities, better scheduling of employee participation and the development of more efficient instructors and instructional techniques. The growing complexity of professional operations and of skills required by intelligence make it extremely unlikely that the Agency can afford or will decide to spend less than present-day amounts on the preparation of its employees to perform their jobs.

III. OFFICE OF TRAINING

A. Introduction

1. The antecedents of CIA's present-day training program are readily identified for it has been the undoubted good fortune of the Agency to descend in continuous line from the wartime Office of Strategic Services. Even today there continue among the staff a substantial contingent of officers who helped to establish OSS training programs, who were trained in OSS classrooms, and who have conducted and evaluated the operations of the past to derive the content of developing intelligence doctrine.

2. Continuity in terms of the administrative structure of training understandably became extremely thin immediately after the war when the contracting OSS structure was divided with operations components in the form of the Special Services Unit passing to the control of Army and research elements transferring to the Department of State. The reunion of the parts took place during 1946 and 1947 first by formation of the Central Intelligence Group, then by establishment of the CIA. Included among the elements was a training division in the Office of Special Operations which for the next two years or so required just five rooms in Que Building for administrative purposes and numbered on paper positions.

3. The administration of training in its present-day form was inaugurated on 3 January 1951 with the establishment of an Office of Training and the EOD of its first and present director, Col. Matthew C. Baird. He reported for the next four years directly to the DCI, until

early in 1955, at the recommendation of the Inspector General, OTR (along with the Offices of Personnel and Communications, which had also been reporting directly to the DCI) was brought under the Deputy Director for Support where it is presently located.

4. The Training Division of OSO had been expanded in 1949 to provide for the training needs of the Office of Policy Coordination.

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5. The Director of Training was charged at the outset with responsibility for the development of a junior officer training program and for the planning of career development. By mid-1951 he had

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The training efforts of the support and research components of CIA were virtually nonexistent up to this time; consequently OTR was extremely active in the first few months in launching an orientation program for all new employees of the Agency, induction and refresher training for clericals, and instruction in languages. Also in July of this year the first career service plan was submitted to the DCI. The plan, however, called for a high degree of selectivity of

personnel. In consequence, task forces were established to study the issues involved and approximately two more years elapsed before a career service in its present-day form was inaugurated.

6. OTR acquired a staff of some [] persons during 1951, then doubled in size in each of the successive two years. In 1954 it numbered

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[]
[] This rapid expansion not only reflected the general growth pattern and training demands of the Agency, but, in addition, it indicated the planning and development of a permanent, large-scale organization able to deal with a broad range of typical present-day governmental training requirements. In 1953 the curriculum was expanded to provide courses in communism, in supervision and management and in such administrative areas as operations support and administrative procedures. From that time forward there has been a proliferation of courses adapted to special needs, but no further expansion into major new departments of instruction. The relative youth of the Agency, however, may have forestalled thus far the evolution of a training pattern and facility for mid-careerists, an area which the Department of State has been investigating actively in recent years.

7. About five years were required to stabilize the Office of Training in its mission and functions and in its present structure. Until early 1953, the Office consisted of two components with a Deputy Director (Special) directing covert training programs and a Deputy Director (General) directing the overt programs of the Agency. In 1953 substantial unification occurred with the designation of a single deputy

director, four staffs and eight operating divisions. In 1955 proceeding jointly with the Inspector General and Management Staff, OTR arrived at its present organization in four major schools:

Operations School

Intelligence School

School of International Communism

Language and Area School

supported by four staffs:

Plans and Policy Staff

Assessment and Evaluation Staff

Registrar (including control of external training)

Support Staff

8. There are several aspects of CIA training history worthy of special note.

a. The extreme diversity of skills and professions employed by intelligence -- estimated at 1250 distinct job descriptions at the present time -- and the extent of compartmentation dictated by security considerations undoubtedly combine to explain the large number of relatively autonomous component training programs. Communications training, for example, with roots deep in OSS experience, has remained the exclusive responsibility of the Office of Communications from the beginning. [In ?

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[REDACTED] DD/S in turn has sponsored the development of local training programs in Logistics, Security and Medical Staff for example, and DD/I has developed formal courses including information handling and statistics. There are a number of influences at work tending to stabilize these programs in their present locations among which security considerations, limited demand, accessibility and responsiveness to local needs may be noted.

b. A second pervasive influence affecting training policy has been the quality and location of physical training facilities. Dispersion of Agency offices and buildings has been paralleled by the dispersion and general inadequacy of OTR classrooms. Some of the present-day administrative pattern undoubtedly reflects the strong desire of operating offices to economize on staff and instructor time through sharply focussed local training.

c. Finally, it is a frequently stated objective of all government training programs to avoid duplication in an internal training system of courses and programs readily available and often of high quality offered at universities or elsewhere. Both DD/S and DD/I have acknowledged this principle by sending staff outside for training in the operation of specialized equipment; e.g., International Business Machine, and for graduate study in such fields as mathematics and economics. The DD/P has made some use of external language training by OTR arrangement [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Notwithstanding, the Agency has not, for reasons

of security, placed heavy reliance to date on outside or shared community facilities.

9. Mention should also be made of the effort over the past ten years to establish training prerequisites for job assignments and to derive predictable student enrollments on which to base development of training facilities, recruitment of instructors, and scheduling of classes. For jobs involving technical skills of one kind or another, the component offices have acted responsibly and with considerable uniformity to stipulate training prerequisite to appointment or promotion to journeyman status. Beginning as early as 1952 the principal staffs and some divisions of the DD/P issued instructions which specified professional intelligence training essential to the principal job assignments. The DD/I did not move as positively in this direction because of the expectation that most of the professional skills it required could be recruited ready trained in the open market. Unfortunately, Agency experience with job standards has produced discouraging results, to the extent in some cases that regulations have been rescinded. Training requirements have all too consistently taken second place to operating priorities deriving from international crises, health problems, personal preference or prejudice. The Agency's experience, however, has not been unique as is apparent in the following recent comment on the much older training program of the Department of State:

"In the Department of State, it is probably still true that many officers dislike being assigned to training. Operations officers in the geographic bureaus try to prevent their best men from being assigned to training and they tend to succeed in this endeavor ... It seems likely that training in the Department of State will never

be of high quality until training is accepted -- as it is in the military services -- as an essential part in the process of developing high-quality officers." pp 40-41, Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the United States, Staff Study for the Committee on Foreign Relations. GPO. 1958.

25X1A 10. It should be noted in conclusion that an earlier Agency-wide measure to deal with these questions was launched in 1956 with the issuance of "Headquarters Participation in Training." This regulation stipulated that it would be the policy of the Agency to expend at least five per cent of its total man-hours of headquarters "on-duty" staff personnel in training. While the regulation remains in force at the present time, a general revision of training regulations is currently in process and the five per cent requirement has been held in abeyance by informal action for the past twelve months. The requirement, nevertheless, had a major influence on component office policy towards training and on the volume of training provided to Agency personnel. It moved the component offices and the Office of Training to undertake orderly inventory of training courses and better programming of training requirements. Many offices substantially met the five per cent requirement and all offices have given their training problems more careful consideration as a result. It seems certain that the measure made a timely contribution towards the evolution of a better coordinated, Agency-wide training program. On the other hand continuation of an arbitrary figure for training simply perpetuates training for the sake of compliance with a regulation. The Agency is now mature enough to require the supervisors to accept the responsibility for insuring that all personnel receive the training they require.

B. The Intelligence School

1. The five faculties comprising the Intelligence School include intelligence orientation, intelligence production, clerical training, operations support and management. There is a T/O of instructors of whom five are on assignment from other parts of the Agency. There is no simple rule of thumb setting the jurisdictional lines of the School. Orientation, clerical training and management training are Agency-wide responsibilities. Operations support instruction is addressed to DD/S and DD/P requirements. Intelligence production courses deal with the needs of professional employees in the DD/I. The School contributes a major portion of the initial ten weeks of headquarters training of JOT's and is exclusively responsible for the subsequent twelve weeks of training in intelligence production provided to that segment of the JOT's who are designated to go to the DD/I. Thus the School has contact with virtually every new employee of the Agency, in many cases in advance of his acquaintance with his working supervisors.

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2. No other school in OTR is faced with more elusive problems than those with which the Intelligence School must deal. Where training in skills has been involved, its staff has proceeded with confidence and general efficiency. In the areas of employee orientation, management skills and intelligence production, however, there has been limited consensus as to what was to be done and the OTR effort has been subject to constant adjustment. The principal problems facing the school are discussed in detail below.

3. Orientation of any audience diverse in age, grade and profession is a difficult undertaking without introducing the complication peculiar to CIA of security limitations on description of complex and interesting activities. There are two obvious objectives in orientation -- to provide motivation and to impart certain general facts about an organization. There are ever present dangers of superficiality and boredom in brief treatment of orientation subjects. There is no effective measure of results. CIA now provides separate orientation series for its clericals, its JOT's and for all other professional employees, GS-7 and above, entering the Agency. The principal exemptions from Agency orientation are operators recruited by the Office of Communications and employees in very sensitive positions.

4. With the JOT program now undergoing major expansion as the principal supplier of professional manpower to the Agency, various questions have been raised about the orientation training appropriate to a declining EOD population of non-JOT's. There is desire to economize on instructor staff and on the time of senior officials who make up the large roster of guest lecturers employed. The Basic Orientation Course for non-JOT's has just recently been reduced from four to three weeks, consisting of one week of general orientation and two weeks on Communism. Guest lectures have been taped and transcribed in order to experiment with heavier use of reading materials. This approach is perfectly reasonable so long as the attendant risk is recognized and guarded against. Motivation by impersonal means is apt to be far more difficult to achieve than by face-to-face lectures and discussions with the leaders of the Agency.

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Secondly, the Agency must scrupulously avoid any suggestion that the non-JOT is a second-class citizen to be segregated in all respects, including training, from the JOT elite. Rather, he must be given every inducement to upgrade the role he plays and to rise by demonstrated excellence to top rank, particularly through opportunity to qualify for JOT training.

5. There is a further aspect of orientation, namely, written communication, in which the Agency's practice departs from that of most large organizations. For reasons of security few of the usual devices for staff communication, including employee publications, newsletters, annual reports, employee manuals and bulletin boards covering employment opportunities and other Agency business, are put to general use by CIA to motivate and integrate its employees into the organization. There is no way of determining what this costs the Agency in quality of service and in employee turnover. The entire field merits new study including the possibility of revision and reissue of the 1952 brochure "Your Job in the Central Intelligence Agency."

6. In management and supervision training the principal problem is the relatively embryonic state of development of the subject anywhere -- in government, in private business and in the universities. Handling of people is, first of all, an art, not a science. In addition, CIA with its brief history of extremely rapid growth, youthful staff and evolving mission does not yet afford settled patterns from which to derive a management doctrine. In this situation management training must employ instructors who have a record of successful administration of operations and it must reach today's managers as well as those showing potential for the future.

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Up to the present time the record of participation by managers in management training has been rather poor. The DD/P, in particular, with major inherent problems in staff communication, has participated least, having enrolled, for example, 42 out of 216 taking management courses in 1958 and 1959, of which only nine attended during the latter year. The Agency's senior managers, with some notable exceptions, simply have not been convinced that they or their staffs require special management training to perform their jobs efficiently. Many of those who would concede that such training could be of benefit are dubious about the content of the present instruction.

7. There is evidence enough of deficient management practice in the Agency, even though the Agency's over-all performance has undoubtedly improved with increasing maturity. There would of course continue to be cases of deficient practice were all managers formally trained in management techniques and policy. The Agency, however, has yet to take a firm position on the need for such training in preparing its executive personnel to exercise their responsibilities. The experience of the Department of State suggests what may lie ahead for CIA on its present course. Only in 1956 and under strongest pressure did the Department finally launch a plan for mid-career training for its Foreign Service Officers of ranks 3, 4 and 5, to run twelve weeks and to include two weeks devoted to case studies in executive management.

8. The problem with respect to instruction in intelligence for the DD/I professional intelligence officer is once again a lack of consensus on what is needed. The problem is discussed in greater detail at

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a later point in this survey in connection with the training of economists. The DD/I offices to date have generally denied need for such training. Certain courses in intelligence research techniques have been developed by OTR but enrollments have been insignificant. Courses in effective speaking, writing and conference leadership, which, in general, have limited bearing on substantive competence, have been offered but in the face of the very grave doubt that the deficiencies should have been tolerated during recruitment and apprenticeship. Again it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this training in the context of the many elements which determine the individual's over-all performance on the job. Be this as it may, courses which instruct all performers, strong or weak, in preferred techniques would appear to be on considerably safer ground than those which are purely remedial in character.

9. Training in intelligence for DD/I professionals can and must achieve a better rationale than aid for the marginal performer. A way is open if the DD/I will agree to recruitment of the bulk of his junior officer requirement through a truly Agency-wide JOT system and if he will send his best qualified officers to cooperate with the Office of Training on a continuing basis in the design and evaluation of the JOT course content. As the Agency matures, mid-career and senior officer training will be essential to assure a breadth of vision in intelligence complementing that which the DD/I professional will obtain in his special field through sabbaticals and through continuing activity in outside professional associations. The content of this training need not be unpalatable to DD/I personnel for it has the precedence of the senior staff colleges for the

military and there is an unending array of cross-disciplinary problems on which the intelligence researcher must be challenged to think constructively.

10. Clerical training raises a host of questions for which there are no simple answers. The basic factor determining present CIA clerical training policy is the difficult market for clerical staff. The Agency has a large requirement for clerical support overseas and out of its own and State Department ~~exp~~erience has reached the conclusion that clerical employees under 21 years of age are apt to be too immature to adjust satisfactorily to the living conditions and work pressures of overseas assignments. This limitation and its high standards in recruitment generally throw the Agency into the competition for the highest quality personnel on the market. There are, of course, many other complications, including salary competition and high living costs plus difficult living conditions in the headquarters area. The most important additional factor is the Agency's large-scale employment of young women who are marriageable or, if married, contribute a major element of the attrition rate by reason of childbearing. CIA recruited in excess of clerical personnel during 1959 and could expect according to current experience to have the average clerical employee resign after only 18 months of service. 25X9

11. The initial location and screening of clerical candidates for employment is performed by CIA field recruiters. These men look in particular to the heads of responsible commercial training schools for leads on desirable candidates. Applicants are required to take United States Employment Service proficiency tests wherever possible, where this is not feasible the testing may be waived until EOD on presentation of

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certification of proficiency by a high school or commercial training institution. Such certification unfortunately has frequently proved to be unreliable. The recruiters themselves present and score a test worked out by OTR's Assessment and Evaluation Staff covering basic aptitudes and personality factors. About 80 per cent of all candidates are rejected in the present period for poor test scores and other deficiencies. The long wait for security clearance is a factor at this point in holding desirable candidates and the Office of Personnel has found it necessary from 1948 forward to bring about half of its clerical recruits on duty in an interim assignment pool in advance of clearance.

12. Up to this point the Agency has exercised options on the rigorousness of its testing and the decision to EOD in advance of full clearance. It is perhaps inevitable that the recruiters, the clerical trainers and the consumers differ on the policies involved. The trainers understandably hope to start with personnel of high proficiency, instead they frequently meet up with recruits who fail to demonstrate their certified qualifications. The recruiters, with intimate knowledge of the market and in view of the high CIA attrition rate, question the need and results of the A&E testing and the, to them, unrealistic rate of rejection of candidates. Both parties attest to the frequent waste of quality personnel in inadequate assignments. An off-the-cuff estimate is that eight out of ten secretaries with shorthand make little or no use of their skill because their executives do not dictate their correspondence.

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13. The clerical faculty offers instruction in typing, shorthand, English usage, and geography. A three-day Agency orientation is provided for clericals cleared for office duty. A packet of these courses is provided at induction for individuals awaiting clearance. The average length of training at this point is three weeks, the range is from one to five weeks. A second packet of courses is provided as refresher instruction for individuals seeking to qualify for more responsible assignments, or

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This training runs

20 - 30 hours part-time.

14. In summary, clerical training must be weighed in the broader context of clerical recruitment, job assignment, utilization and attrition. Must the Agency hire employees who require extensive training in typing and shorthand immediately following entrance on duty? Does the A&E testing applied to clerical candidates justify itself in the light of present-day attrition rates? Are the recruiters reaching segments of the market less subject to attrition due to marriage and childbearing? What portion of clerical loss is due to waste of talent in low quality assignments? The evidence on these matters must be regularly reassessed.

It is recommended that:

The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program.

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~~SECRET~~E. Language & Area School1. Introduction

a. Recognizing the essential role that foreign language skills play in the pursuit of the Agency's mission, Regulation entitled "Language Development Program," lays a clear mandate on certain key officials to develop the necessary capability. In brief, the program calls for the determination of requirements for foreign language competence and prescribes action for training Agency personnel to meet those requirements. The regulation assigns responsibility to the Deputy Directors to establish the requirements and to assure the continuing attainment and retention of foreign language proficiency by staff personnel under their jurisdiction. The heads of Career Services and Operating Officials are to direct or encourage their employees to engage in language study and the Director of Training is to exercise general direction of the program. He is to provide for directed and voluntary language training in approved courses and programs, establish standards and proficiency tests, and to administer the monetary Achievement and Maintenance Awards. The Director of Personnel is directed to maintain a current inventory of the language competences of staff personnel. The Regulation further provides that a five-man Committee for Language Development, consisting of one representative each of the three Deputy Directors and of the Offices of Training and Personnel, shall recommend and periodically review policies, procedures and other matters affecting the program, including language awards.

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F. Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP)

1. Establishment of the Program

a. A recruitment and training program for junior officers was inaugurated in CIA in 1951 immediately following the establishment of the Office of Training. The first class of JOT's was assembled in July of that year. Recruitment of JOT's was assigned to the Office of Personnel, selection and placement were reserved to the JOTP administration, and assessment and training were delegated to the appropriate staffs and schools of OTR. The concept of selection in depth was implemented during the first two years by means of a policy of assigning the trainee, after formal instruction, to on-the-job training with a line unit while continuing his slotting on the OTR rolls. This now well established policy was also based on recognition that the first experiences of the JOT with supervision and work assignments are vital to his long-range motivation and that a monitoring and recovery mechanism is essential both for the man and the program against the hazards of the operational scene.

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c. Between July of 1951 and December of 1959 the Junior Officer Training Program enrolled a total of 517 men and 59 women, 576 in all, at a rate of about 45 per year during the first five years and

80 per year from 1956 to the present. In 1960 the JOTP is expanding once again to a new level of 142 students per year. As of the end of 1959 there were a total of 238 JOT graduates on duty in the component offices of the Agency as follows: 187 or 79 per cent with the DD/P, 42 or 18 per cent with the DD/I and nine or three per cent with the DD/S. A loss of 170 JOT students or graduates was incurred over the nine years, and the balance of 168 consisted of students still under JOTP control and assigned either to the first phase formal training or to the second-phase on-the-job training in operating offices.

2. Activities

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h. As noted earlier, CIA has recently moved to recruit and train a substantially increased portion of its professional officer types through the JOT system. The revised JOT training quotas as approved by the DCI on 27 February 1960 compare with previous rates as follows:

	<u>Annual current number JOTP graduates (Average for FY 58/59)</u>	<u>Graduates authorized 1960 forward</u>
DD/P	55	90
DD/S	3	8
DD/I	<u>6</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	64	123

The JOTP is authorized henceforth to recruit 142 JOT candidates annually, the excess over 123 representing allowance for attrition during training.

1. The new rate of 90 JOT graduates for the DD/P is expected to be reached in 1963. This number will suffice to cover projected annual DD/P losses that must be made good by outside recruitment. In addition to this source, however, there will be staff additions at the GS-9 level and above by promotion, transfers into the DD/P from other parts of the Agency, and separate recruitment for TSD, amounting in all to 60 per year. The projected comprehensive DD/P requirement thus amounts to 150 professional officers GS-9 and above per year. The JOT rate of eight for the

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k. The outlook in JOT recruiting for 1960 is thought to be generally satisfactory, particularly so in the case of candidates offering graduate degrees. This attests to the apparent competitiveness of the Agency position in the market.. The GS-7 is now the standard entrance grade and the GS-9 is generally granted at graduation from the JOIP two years later. There is considerable concern, however, over the fact that 48 accepted candidates rejected the Agency's offer in 1959 due to better opportunities elsewhere, doubts about the program or change in personal circumstances. While this loss may simply indicate the price of doing business in a quality market, it obviously bears watching to ensure that the Agency makes a strong appeal to talented individuals and that it remains competitive salary-wise in the market. ✓

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1. The JOTP has achieved solid acceptance in the Agency by locating students of high character and demonstrated academic performance, then instructing and motivating them in the objectives and methods of intelligence to the point where they readily adapt to and become productive in operating assignments. Once separated from the JOTP, the stiffest test of all is the willingness and ability of the JOT to fend for himself.

3. Future of the JOT Program

a. Recruitment

(1) Numerous policy questions arise in this area of administration of the JOT system. Many of these stand out in a comparison of the JOTP with the Foreign Service Officer recruitment program in the Department of State. By contrast, the JOTP administration has enjoyed singular freedom of action while the Department has been subject to constant public and congressional examination particularly as an outgrowth of the work of the Wriston Committee. New rules and structure may be imposed on the JOTP to achieve specific benefits but at considerable risk of hampering the positive leadership the program has enjoyed thus far. The Department's policies and experience should, however, be followed closely with the intention of adopting and profiting from measures of proven benefit.

(2) JOT recruitment does not assuredly reach all American citizens who may possess suitable qualifications for careers in CIA. The absence of a publicly advertised, competitive entrance test, and the use of professional officers on recruitment tours (as now

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practiced in the case of ORR) would remove any doubt that the Agency does not adequately protect the inherent privilege of citizens to learn of and to apply for employment with it.

(3) There is no requirement that the JOTP balance its appointments by State or region of origin and schooling. While the present patterns of recruitment do not appear to be seriously out of balance in this respect there are aspects of the Agency's policy here which will bear observation. The first is the possible political implication at some time in the future of disproportionately low representation of officers from the South and to a lesser extent from the Far West. The second concerns heavy recruitment of students from Ivy League schools and the possible influences on loyalty to associates and judgment of individual performance which this circumstance may be alleged to generate.

(4) The JOTP administration may be assuming excessive responsibility in the screening and selection of junior officer candidates. This same issue is noted below in connection with the final assessment and assignment of JOT's to active duty. As the JOTP assumes increasing responsibility for determining the types of individuals who are to man the Agency it seems obvious that the current operating experience of senior professional officers should be brought to bear in making the decision. There are today fairly numerous consumer comments that present JOTP selections tend to overemphasize [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A policy of panel examination of top candidates with professional line officers included on the panels would insure JOTP sensitivity to Agency needs at this point.

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(5) There is a second possible source of independent judgment of applicant qualifications in the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process. These individuals may have the handicap of limited acquaintance with intelligence but they may also contribute useful insight based on long experience in government, corporation or university administration.

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c. Intelligence Training for Specialists

The JOTP has been oriented from its beginning toward the development of generalists. It has sought to recruit and train junior officers of fairly diverse background to perform basic intelligence assignments anywhere in the world. The JOT generalist has proved himself well suited to the professional work of the DD/P and to many of the basic duties of the Offices of Current Intelligence and Operations in the DD/I. With limited exceptions, the Program has not undertaken systematic recruitment and training in intelligence for specialists -- lawyers, accountants, economists and scientists -- required by the DD/S, the research offices of the DD/I and the Technical Services Division of the DD/P. This situation poses two questions which the Agency has yet to answer: Will the specialist profit from formal training in intelligence? Should the Agency pursue a policy of developing all of its professional officers and in particular its future leadership according to a common basic training and development pattern? The arguments on both sides of these questions are diverse. There is reluctance in the support and research areas to afford the training time involved in the case of specialists. There is a widespread opinion that the principal career opportunities lie with the DD/P and that JOT's will not voluntarily elect service with the DD/S or DD/I. On the other hand, the small number of JOT's who have been assigned to specialist duties in the Agency have served with distinction and, finally, the current plan to introduce more JOT's into the DD/I and DD/S seems certain to bring these questions into sharper focus in the near future. It seems safe to say that the possibilities of a single, integrated plan for recruitment and development of all professional officers is the course

for the future. (The problem of training specialists for the intelligence profession is appraised more fully in the following section of this report entitled "Training the Specialist Professional Officer".)

d. Placement of JOT's

(1) The JOTP exercises substantial freedom in the assessment and allocation of JOT's to specialized training and in their placement in operating offices for on-the-job training. Part of the explanation lies with the Agency, part with the JOT's themselves.

(2) Few if any Agency components have successfully projected manpower requirements several years into the future, either in terms of numbers or special qualifications. Any projected division requirement for a given number of officers with specific language, area, or other competence may have doubled or evaporated three years hence depending on a host of possible developments. In consequence, operating offices have been forced to limit their specifications to the general qualifications of character, educational performance, linguistic aptitude and personality. The JOTP has employed educational and psychological screening as aids to JOT selection but in the last analysis has relied on its collective judgment based on long experience.

(3) The Program has also shown considerable tolerance toward the preferences of the individual JOT, both at time of selection for specialized, e.g., case officer, training and later in the selection of a job assignment. Some men with excellent qualifications for the DD/I and DD/S can regularly be expected to find the DD/P more attractive. Thus it is not certain at this stage that the new DD/I and DD/S quotas can be

filled. There is an understandable gravitational pull to the DD/P career but in addition there is a subtle instructor and student climate that rates selection to the DD/P as success and allocation to the other Directorates as "second rank" performance. In some instances this climate is generated even in the recruitment stage. The JOTP, OTR and the Office of Personnel must combat these prejudices with vigor if they are to cater successfully to the basic needs of the DD/I and DD/S.

(4) The JOTP and the Directorates are overly isolated from each other and communication on junior officer training policies at the intermediate command levels is clearly deficient. One answer, as with recruitment, is to rotate line officers to serve on JOTP panels that make basic decisions so that their advice on placement policy will be assured. The JOTP will acquire a convincing base for its judgments and the line officials will return to their regular duties with increased awareness of training and personnel development policies.

e. Attrition among JOT's

(1) It was noted earlier that the JOT is expected to stand on his own two feet following graduation from JOTP sponsorship. How well he is succeeding in doing so is a matter of obvious concern to trainers for the light it may shed on the effectiveness of selection, instruction and motivation. The subject is of increasing interest in the Agency; however, there is as yet no systematic program for review of JOT careers and identification of adjustment problems before they mature to the point of resignation. Both the Office of Personnel and the Inspector General Staff conduct resignation interviews, and the Directors

of Personnel and OTR and the JOTP see many JOT's and ex-JOT's informally on career matters.

(2) There has been severe attrition amounting to a total of some 20 per cent per year among JOT's in training. Of these, the JOT's under military sponsorship have contributed a loss rate of 40 per cent, women 17 per cent and civilian men 14 per cent. Approximately one-half have departed to pursue other careers of greater interest to them while the remainder have left for reasons associated with CIA employment. There is no evidence at hand that would indicate that the Agency's experience is unfavorable when compared to that of other large organizations. In view, however, of basic handicaps facing careers in intelligence including security restrictions, ethical issues and the relatively low ceiling on earning power, it is essential that the Agency regularly measure its officer development experience against that of comparable organizations.

(3) The attrition record for JOT graduates is even more difficult to evaluate. The evidence for the classes of 1951 through 1955 should be of interest since these individuals are by now well advanced in status as case officers with five to seven years of experience on-the-job. The significance of the record is qualified, however, by the rapid evolution of recruitment and instruction policy during this initial phase of the program and by the fact that these classes were launched in the setting of the Korean War, the rapid early expansion of the Agency's manpower, and in an era of business prosperity with varied employment opportunity. Of the 243 individuals enrolled over the five years,

1951-1955, there were 118 remaining on duty at the start of 1960. Of the 125 losses, approximately half occurred from duty stations following graduation from the JOTP. Thirty-five of the student losses were cases of failure to return from military duty.

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(4) At the present time JOT graduates account for approximately [] professionals, GS-9 and above, in the DD/P. The patterns of JOT career adjustment may be expected to change considerably as this proportion increases and as JOT careerists begin to compete for senior grade jobs. In the DD/P there are a number of questions here which will require forthright, coordinated answers if JOT graduates are not to walk the halls trying haphazardly to achieve personal solutions.

(5) There is no consensus thus far on what training and experience should constitute the case officer apprenticeship. In the absence of a pattern, the individual faces many difficulties in planning his future and gauging his progress, while his supervisor in the absence of a doctrine tends to let immediate operational priorities override the longer range career considerations involved.

(6) There are no standards setting forth minimum training and language competence which the apprentice must possess as prerequisites to the given overseas assignment. There is a proliferation of advanced operations courses but no policy as to which are essential to initial overseas assignment and which may wait for a subsequent tour of duty at headquarters.

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
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which faces the senior JOT graduates, and non-JOT's, at the present time. There is insufficient evidence for generalization but in some cases the experience here has been discouraging. Some former JOT's now operate on the conviction that diversification is a matter of personal initiative, and accomplished by knowing the right person and being in the right place at the right time. Well qualified officers have located suitable vacancies only to find that the concern of the employing Branch for its own, perhaps less well qualified individuals, has precluded appointment. The net result then is frustration and possible resignation for the individual and haphazard administration of the broad personnel objectives of the Directorate. The power of decision here lies with the Branch Chief. The Panel system of Career management as now constituted doesn't really get at the problems involved. In some manner, particularly in the case of highly qualified and expensively trained JOT's, it will be essential that the DD/P, and in time the DD/I and DD/S, provide for a more orderly personnel administration. The career officer must know what to expect and how to plan the broad outlines of his career. The Department of State is also experimenting with this problem as a result of severe criticism by the Wriston Committee of its previous informal practices. Recent State innovations include the development of training and experience standards for all Foreign Service positions, the establishment of an inventory system on punched cards to record individual training status and to derive annual training requirements, the imposition of sanctions to enforce training policy including a requirement that language competence be a prerequisite to advancement, and, finally, the creation

of a Career Development and Counselling Staff of experienced Foreign Service Officers to advise on personnel policy and monitor the career planning of individual officers. These measures are not yet proved instruments of a forward looking personnel management policy, nor are they necessarily suited to the needs of CIA. They do merit close observation and they are suggestive of the directions in which the Agency may need to move if it experiences severe attrition among its most highly qualified and carefully trained personnel.

It is recommended that:

- (a) The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP
- (b) The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOTP, should chair the panel.
- (c) The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above.
- (d) The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates in JOTP placement panels.
- (e) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers.



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- (g) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit.

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4. Training the Specialist Professional Officer

a. The following discussion of training policy and programs in ORR is intended to highlight the problems of the specialist professional officer in CIA. Although not necessarily typical of all specialists, it contains the basic elements applicable to those who prepare for a chosen vocation prior to embarking on an intelligence career. ORR was selected because it has devoted much time and careful consideration to the possible roles of training in the development of economists for intelligence. The conclusions that have evolved out of its experience to date are so basic and so clear that they merit citing in detail. They are contained in a paper prepared in 1958 on the subject of "Training for Economic Intelligence Production" and may be summarized as follows:

- (1) A foundation in the conceptual framework of economics;
- (2) Ability to work in primary sources through command of the necessary languages;
- (3) Study of the geography, economies, histories and cultures, as well as the government and politics of target countries;
- (4) Appreciation of the impact of new weapon systems on military strategy, national security and the industrial economies of countries concerned;
- (5) Familiarity with industrial and technical problems and developments;
- (6) Indoctrination in the machinery and procedures of intelligence.

b. The fourth and sixth areas clearly fall within the responsibility of the intelligence community to provide although it should be noted that the requirement is for orientation, not professional competence, in the fields of technology or strategy concerned. The balance of the specifications relate to the normal present-day academic preparation of economists. Their underlying purpose is indoctrination in research methodology. All of which makes

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it clear that ORR will normally expect to recruit its professionals ready trained from the open market. In fact, it is doubtful that an intelligence organization could justify or succeed if it undertook to provide such professional preparation internally in competition with academic institutions.

c. The normal career considerations of professional economists continue to exert a major influence on ORR training policy once an economist is recruited and entered on duty in the office. The sabbatical at the end of ten or more years of professional service is mentioned with increasing frequency as the most natural and desirable block of training at mid-career. It is a consideration for the future in ORR only because of the youth of the Office and of its professional personnel.

d. Professional stature through full-fledged participation in professional associations is another element of almost equal importance. ORR was required on security grounds to bar its professionals from such participation during the first years of its existence. Beginning in 1959, however, the Office turned to outside economist consultants to evaluate periodically the quality of its performance. Two of their recommendations since adopted have called for responsible participation by ORR economists in their professional associations, and for distribution of selected sanitized ORR studies to a roster of some 150 economists and businessmen throughout the country. The implication is that ORR economists have been in danger of becoming inbred as intelligence researchers. A further motivation for the change is the hope that overt demonstration of quality will ease the ORR recruitment problem which is discussed below in another context.

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e. Thus the profile of the present-day professional economist in intelligence reflects the strong gravitational pull of the academic world. Training requirements that would mean substantial and continuing instructional load for OTR have been at a minimum. Internal training for the economist in intelligence has tended to be peripheral to his specialty or focussed on deficiencies in performance. The freer contacts now in prospect between ORR and the outside world indeed are likely to reinforce present patterns and to accelerate the adaptation of academic career patterns to ORR needs.

f. This ORR pattern which appears eminently sensible from the perspective of the economist must also, however, be examined from the point of view of the intelligence administrator. The painful fact in the present period is that economists are in exceeding short supply in the market. Therefore the natural policy of recruitment of prepared professionals does not work. ORR is forced to resort to emergency recruitment measures including employment of partially trained economists. A number of conflicts then arise over the manner in which such individuals may best be prepared for and integrated into the profession of economist in intelligence.

g. Some five years ago ORR began experiencing personnel shortages which it then undertook to make good by regularly sending professional economists to canvass the universities jointly with the Agency's recruiters. The results to date have been generally disappointing with an average of three to five recruitments for every 100 interviews of selected potential candidates. These recruitment teams have been at a disadvantage in the salary competition among other things and through time have sought and secured certain compensations such as authority to reimburse for EOD travel expenses when the candidate

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possesses an M. A. degree. This authority has not thus far been extended to the other recruitment programs of the Agency including, in particular, the JOTP, which suggests a need for greater uniformity of practice as noted in the discussion of that program.

h. In light of these disappointing results ORR late in 1959 developed a junior economist training program which as now contemplated proposes to recruit students in their senior year of college, bring them into the Agency upon graduation for a year of orientation and assessment, then send the most promising to graduate schools for advanced training (the Masters Degree) at Agency expense. This approach has now been authorized but is not yet underway.

i. The relationship between this program and the Agency's JOT program at the present time is ambiguous to say the least. The recently approved plans for expansion of the JOT program call for the delivery of 25 graduates per year to the DD/I. Obviously some will go to ORR. Many of these men and women will have had graduate training, some of it in the social sciences. The training of the DD/I JOT's will be characterized by increased emphasis on intelligence research methodology and reduced emphasis on clandestine operations.

j. The prospect of all of this, however, is that ORR will now be recruiting three different patterns of professionals no two of which will have a common preparation in intelligence. The JOT will be exceptionally well grounded in intelligence and perhaps, though not necessarily, less well prepared in economics and research methodology. The ORR junior economist will apparently have no grounding other than apprenticeship experience in

intelligence research and will not even achieve productive professional status as an economist until some time in the third year or later. Finally, it is to be expected that ORR will succeed in recruiting some professionally trained economists but these will receive little beyond orientation to compare with the JOT's advanced preparation in intelligence.

k. For further evidence of the desirability of exposing economists' to JOT training, the records of JOT trained personnel now on duty in ORR were examined. The evidence supplied for all eleven individuals involved showed impressively favorable results. A number of these JOT's had had full operations training and even some experience in DD/P assignments. It is conceivable that some of their effectiveness in their ORR roles resulted from their fuller appreciation of collection methodology and programs.

l. Also to be noted in passing is the conflict between JOT and ORR demands on the recruitment system. ORR makes heavy use of the Agency's professional recruiters each fall at the time they are needed and will be needed increasingly to support the expanded JOT requirement. There is even some indication of competition between the two requirements for the same individual.

m. The recent Inspector General's Survey of the CIA Career Service proposed for career management purposes to classify the economist as a specialist outside the profession of intelligence. His calling is not peculiar to the Agency and he has the option of pursuing it elsewhere in the government or in private life whenever he chooses to do so. The reaction of ORR economists and other DD/I specialists to this proposition was emphatic disagreement and the counterclaim that they be classified in the first place as professional intelligence officers, secondly as economists.

n. Thus the issue for the DD/I is whether to develop the specialist intelligence officer with or without training in intelligence? The paper on "Training for Economic Intelligence Production" referred to earlier prescribed only the basic orientation course (now three weeks in length) as formal introduction to intelligence. Nothing more. Apparently ORR expects to rely almost exclusively on experience without the benefit of training to broaden the outlook and acquaint the ORR career economist with the many aspects of the total intelligence business that add up to the profession of intelligence.

o. There is an alternative to this approach and it lies in providing some training in common for all intelligence officers regardless of their specializations. This objective underlies the JOT program and has done so from its start although here again separatist tendencies in the component offices of the Agency have led to excessive JOTP concentration on DD/P officer requirements.

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q. There is no intent here to advise reduction in the amount of kinds of present-day ORR training for economists. Nor at this stage will agreement come easily on the content of training in intelligence for ORR and other DD/I specialists. The DD/I must work very closely with the Office of Training in the future to insure that such training, particularly that provided DD/I JOT's, is of professional quality, realistic, and accomplishing results equivalent to the successes achieved by the JOT program in the DD/P to date.

r. The role of the economist in intelligence is likely to change with any increase in emphasis on his training in intelligence. It may be preferable over time to staff ORR with a small corps of professional economists at the Ph. D. level by lateral recruitment or contract and to support this group with a much larger staff of professional officers well trained in economics and in the doctrine and methodology of intelligence. The latter would constitute a professional economist-intelligence officer corps with preparation and versatility that would enable them to serve effectively both in collection and analytical roles. If the economist is not to have professional training in intelligence, and if the Agency cannot find a way to recruit and hold him for career purposes, then the DD/I may be well advised

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s. Due to the youth of the organization perhaps more than for any other reason there is yet to evolve a consensus on what constitutes the professional intelligence officer both generalist and specialist. In its absence agreement is difficult to reach on how he is to be recruited and trained. Lack of agreement produces the paradoxes that are now apparent in the recruitment and training programs discussed above.

It is recommended that:

(1) The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased emphasis be placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs; that ORR and other specialists recruitment be phased down as production of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts at the Ph. D. level.

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(3) Advanced external training for analysts be phased somewhat later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of duty, to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence preparation during the apprenticeship period.

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IV. OTHER AGENCY TRAINING

A. Non-OTR Training

1. Formal courses of instruction are conducted within several of the Agency's major components to train employees in their own special fields. The OTR provides technical guidance and assistance in setting up the courses, furnishes training materials, testing and other services, monitors the instruction and maintains Training records.

2. Such training is conducted in each of the major components of the DD/S area. The extensive facilities of the Office of Communications are discussed in a later section of this Survey. The Office of Personnel runs a two-week Personnel Officers course primarily intended for those officers serving in other components of the Agency both in headquarters and overseas. There also has been established a program of semiannual conferences for senior Personnel officers.

3. Internal training in the Office of Logistics assumes greater proportions. Many officers in the professional categories, such as engineers, lawyers and specialists, bring their qualifications with them when they enter Agency employment and generally must go outside the Agency when additional training is required. The internal program has been designed for the majority of rank and file logistics careerists who must learn how to handle the Agency's complex logistics requirements. The principal training effort is the Logistics Support Course which runs for six weeks and is given at least twice annually. In this course the trainee who is preparing for field assignment receives instruction in procurement, supply, warehousing, real estate, transportation and other

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specialties. Other formal courses of lesser duration include a general logistics orientation, a procurement seminar for higher level officers and other subjects of concern to logistics officers.

4. Training in logistical support for non-Logistics careerists has been primarily tutorial in nature up to the present time but more formal arrangements are evolving. The development of an indoctrination course on Logistics procedures for DD/P field personnel is being encouraged by increasing requirements for such instruction. Efforts are being made to introduce a suitable course in 1961.

5. The Comptroller's Office conducts formal courses in Principles of Budget, Cost Principles, Budget Formulation and the specialized techniques of internal budgetary systems. Although primarily designed for budget and finance careerists these courses are open to administrative and operations officers as well and such attendance is encouraged.

6. The Office of Security also has a rather extensive formal training program which includes basic instruction for special agents, training security officers to support clandestine operations, indoctrination in audio countermeasures techniques and

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7. Within the DD/I area the Office of Operations with its diversified activities accounts for the major part of internal training. Contact Division conducts a combination of basic and refresher training covering information gathering techniques both in general and in specific

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substantive fields. Headquarters and regional conferences are held at regular intervals to keep field representatives in touch with current activities. report- STATSPEC
ing and FDD conducts foreign language reading courses designed for its own careerists but open to others as well.

8. The Office of Central Reference has developed a formal course of instruction in the CIA Library Indexing System for the training of Agency documents analysts and reference librarians and personnel of the military services who are concerned with the Intelligence Subject Code. It also conducts field trips for industrial analysts to familiarize them with equipment, techniques and products of various US industries.

9. The Office of Research and Reports gives instruction in economic statistics and reports writing and is in process of launching a "baccalaureate" program which is discussed in detail in another section of this report. Photo Intelligence Center runs a short course in photo interpretation and is considering an external contract for training in photogrammetry for its staff officers. OSI is in process of evaluating its internal training needs and probably will establish a formal training program soon.

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are not budgeted and costs are not recorded. Instruction is provided by regular staff officers, space is found wherever available, and administrative overhead is absorbed in the regular cost of doing business.

12. The need for this type of specialized training is unchallenged. Objectives are clearly defined and standards are uniformly high. It is directed at the people who need it and since it is under local control it is taken as required. It comes closest to having the chief qualities of the ideal training situation in which needs, requirements, standards, methods of instruction, course content, level and duration, and attendance are all given direction by a single authority.

13. While the evaluation of non-OTR training is generally favorable there is emerging a problem which requires careful attention. It is evident that there is a growing tendency to extend some of these individual courses from the essentially specialized training of a well defined limited group of employees into the larger area of general training by inviting attendance by non-careerists whose assignments are only remotely related to the specific subject being taught. This trend if unchecked will lead to an undesirable dispersion of training responsibility and authority and an uneconomical duplication of training functions. The Inspector General supports the concept of centralization of training wherever the factors of economy, efficiency and effectiveness prevail. When a limited purpose training program is enlarged to serve a general need it should be tested against certain criteria to determine whether the responsibility should remain with the component or be assumed by OTR. Such criteria may be expressed as follows:

Is there a demonstrated need for training employees other than members of the sponsoring career service?

Are additional training facilities required beyond those possessed by the component conducting the program?

Is the course content or doctrine derived from or substantially augmented by another career service?

Does the program require additional manpower either for instruction or support?

14. Existing regulations are not explicit on this point. The DTR's responsibility to develop and direct training programs within OTR is clear but for non-OTR training it is blurred by references to review, approval and advice to Deputy Directors. In the opinion of the Inspector General it should be the clear responsibility of the DTR to determine under whose auspices such training programs should be conducted.

It is recommended that:

- a. The DTR be specifically charged with the responsibility of determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted and,
- b. Pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly.

B. External Training

1. Authority for "Training at Non-CIA Facilities under the Government Employees Training Act" is contained in Agency Regulation

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The regulation specifies that Operating Officials shall originate requests for external training, that heads of career services shall review and endorse all requests, and that the Office of Training shall designate non-CIA facilities with the concurrence of the Director of Security, approve or disapprove all requests, set administrative requirements for participation in external courses and budget and control funds necessary to meet the cost of such training.

2. Under the above authority, CIA sent 759 of its personnel to courses, conferences or demonstrations provided by 103 outside organizations during 1959. An additional 465 persons were enrolled in correspondence courses or in local classes conducted by International Business Machine and Radio Corporation of America in the field of data processing and communications. The cost of the year's program amounted to approximately \$300,000, including travel and per diem as well as registration fees.

3. Of the 759 persons attending external training programs, 499 participated in full-time courses, 260 in part-time courses. Approximately one-half of the enrollments involved absences of one week or less from regular duties.

4. A breakdown of the non-CIA organizations providing training shows that 34 per cent consisted of American universities, 34 per cent were governmental, of which half were civilian, half military, 24 per cent

were private commercial or professional organizations, six per cent were tutorial in nature, and the balance, two per cent, were foreign governments and universities.

5. The following is a resume of the principal external training programs. External language training was provided to 96 Agency personnel of whom 39 were enrolled full-time, 57 part-time, in language courses averaging a semester in duration and often representing installments towards long-term language training objectives. The general problem of language training is examined in detail elsewhere in this survey. For the present, it may be noted that the range of languages included here is by no means limited to the so-called exotic varieties. The training in world languages as a rule reflected special operating requirements, or conflicts in scheduling between the OTR language curriculum and the individual's assignment and travel plans.

6. A total of 100 individuals attended various weapons and missile orientation courses sponsored by the Armed Services. This requirement has been noted in the section of this survey which deals with the training of professional officers in the DD/I. Both economists and scientists have a pervasive need to appreciate the implications of the new weaponry, something which cannot be adequately accomplished by reading nor obtained from unclassified sources.

7. A third example of external training sharply focussed on a specific Agency need is correspondence course training in electronics for personnel of the Office of Communications. There were 143 new enrollments in 1959 and an overall total of 570 OC personnel participating in such training at the end of June 1960. The program reflects both the rapidly changing

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character of this complex field and the desire to enlarge the career opportunities of journeymen communicators (GS-7-9) who characteristically bring high school educations and military training to the job.

8. The external training for professional personnel in CIA is extremely diverse in character. In part it reflects refresher needs, in part individual deficiencies, but over-all probably reflects an effort to adapt a basic preparation in a profession to the peculiar interests and emphases of the Agency. As discussed in the section of the survey dealing with DD/I professional careers and training requirements, it seems entirely possible that external training for professionals in the form of sabbaticals will expand considerably as the Agency ages and a substantial portion of its personnel moves to mid-career status with seniorities of ten and twenty years of experience.

9. The Agency's external training in skills is intensely practical. It reflects such situations as the acquisition of complex equipment and the necessity of training personnel to operate and maintain it. The record shows that this training ranged through courses in diesel motors, heliarc welding, photolithography, packaging and carloading, and fire inspection. The second principal cluster of skills courses concerned business subjects such as patents, contracts, accounting, budgeting and fiscal procedure, executive and management training, and cost reduction in office personnel management.

10. Present-day policy on external management training appears to be forward looking in character and to provide for a sampling of the principal external offerings in order to keep Agency personnel abreast of

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this new and rapidly changing subject. Agency participants are required to have completed OTR management training as a qualification for enrollment.

11. Participation in conferences and seminars may be both a reward for and stimulus to improved performance in Agency assignments. The relatively small numbers of individuals attending any given program simultaneously would appear to reflect sober management reservations about junketing and the preferable alternative of seeing that the trainee relays his information to his associates through staff meetings, trip reports and other suitable devices.

12. It is unlikely that there can ever be complete agreement about the line to be drawn between external training clearly addressed to Agency needs and that which enhances the individual's powers in a specialty for which he was hired and in which he has a moral obligation to maintain proficiency on his own initiative. A prime test in justifying both external and internal training policy is the rate of attrition among individuals in whom the Agency has invested expensive training. A substantial resignation rate is noted elsewhere in the discussions of JOT training and the training of economists for ORR. The school of thought that places principal emphasis on on-the-job training is inclined to be extremely sceptical about subsidized training in an employee's chosen professional field. The feeling is that it tends to forgive the individual his personal obligation and yields a low return in terms of job motivation and attrition. This group would place greater emphasis on the individual's motivation and responsibility by delaying such investment

until there was reasonable demonstration of career intentions and in the area of sabbatical training would ask the individual to bear a substantial portion of the cost himself.

13. Better evidence is required on which to base a judgment of the present balance and effectiveness of the external training program. As one step towards tighter administration of the program it is suggested that the Office of Personnel assemble the training records of resignees for a period of twelve months and that appropriate representatives of OTR examine this evidence to determine whether there is a reasonable rate of return from external training investments and whether modifications are desirable in the guidelines to approving officials concerning minimum length of service in the Agency prior to external training, ceiling on amount and frequency of external training to be invested in the given staff member, and length of service to which the individual should be obligated following such training.

It is recommended that:

DTR review the training records of employees in professional categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960, or longer if necessary, to determine if a more definitive policy governing external training is required.

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C. On-The-Job Training

1. In the total process of acquiring knowledge necessary to perform assigned tasks effectively, on-the-job training plays a major role. It goes on constantly in every place and at every level and it takes many forms. Advice, guidance and direction given and received by superior and subordinate alike, experience derived from daily work activity, the interchange of opinion, thoughts, ideas and observations, all contribute to the process of learning while working. In fact it may be said that the formalized training courses such as those conducted by OTR merely supplement on-the-job training.

2. In this respect the burden of training falls upon the supervisors in all echelons of the command structure. It is not only the mechanics or the techniques of the job that the employee must master, but his growth and development that also is involved. While this responsibility is generally acknowledged by most supervisors it is not observed uniformly or consistently and presents one of the major management problems of the Agency.

3. One of the benefits derived from the adoption in 1956 of the five per cent training requirement was the stimulus given the on-the-job program. Wherever such training was organized into a recognizable course with proper objectives, specified periods of time and qualified direction, it was accepted as the equivalent of formal OTR courses and credited against the requirement accordingly. As a result more time and attention was given this activity by responsible officers and a general improvement in on-the-job training was achieved. The OTR was able to better perform its assigned functions of review and approval.

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4. Although the five per cent requirement has been rescinded all other elements of responsibility for on-the-job training remain. The Deputy Directors and Operating officials are charged by with ensuring that their employees are properly trained, including organized on-the-job training. The DTR still is responsible for developing effective programs and the general supervision of the training effort. With respect to on-the-job training the responsibility of the DTR is almost impossible to perform satisfactorily. 25X1A

5. On-the-job training is not fully organized throughout the Agency and it is impractical to attempt to impose a formalized program much beyond what has already been done. A number of components have well designed courses of instruction but these are generally limited to orientation or simple skills related to internal procedures. Here the DTR can provide the usual support and is able to evaluate the results. The bulk of on-the-job training does not lend itself to organization and it would be patently unfair to hold DTR responsible for any measure of supervision. Furthermore, it is, in our view, improper to divide the responsibility between the appropriate commanders and the head of a supporting service.

6. Deputy Directors are quite properly charged with ensuring that employees are adequately trained and it is equally proper for them to look to their senior subordinates to perform this task. For effective performance, however, the responsibility must not be reassigned below this level. All Agency components, including the area divisions of the Clandestine Service, have designated someone as a training officer. In smaller components he may have other duties to perform; in others he may have assistance. His functions vary from place to place but in the majority he performs duties of a routine nature.

His stature also varies but in general it is far too low to enable him to effectively handle the training responsibilities of the component head.

7. The solution to this problem lies first in the acceptance of training as a function of command; second, the establishment of the training responsibility at the highest level of component command at a minimum; third, the elimination of the split responsibility that now rests obscurely on the DTR. This can be accomplished within present Agency personnel ceilings although some increase in grade level may be required.

It is recommended that:

a. The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the effective performance of proper training functions.

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b. The DTR initiate an amendment to which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort.

D. Communications Training

1. Introduction

a. The Office of Communications (OC) is responsible for the development of staff competence in the fields of radio operation, cryptography, and maintenance of communications equipment. To meet these responsibilities it must train a replacement flow of communicators, retrain and refresh its entire corps periodically in changing techniques and equipment, and ensure that its engineers and senior managers achieve a level of competence that fully supports the communications requirements of the Agency.

b. Research and development throughout the field of communications is in an extremely dynamic state in the present period, accordingly there is a continuing cycle of improvement in equipment, training of personnel in its operation and maintenance, followed by its phasing into operations. Obsolescence status does not necessarily follow for older equipment, however, since the range of CIA requirements runs the spectrum from nearly automatic, high volume central message systems to a one-man manual operations. The ultimate imperative of the system is to have an individual ready and in place to provide a communications link with [] when normal facilities are interrupted by political crisis.

c. These far-ranging responsibilities have caused OC to evolve a highly disciplined skills school and an external training program ranging from correspondence courses open to all ranks of communicators, to training in residence [] for senior personnel whose further training will benefit the Office.

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V. THE FUTURE OF TRAINING IN THE AGENCY

A. Critique of Present Program

1. Summarizing the data presented in the preceding sections of this report we find in many respects a very encouraging picture of accomplishment and, even more encouraging, a determined effort in many places toward greater achievements in the effective preparation of Agency employees for intelligence work. Notable progress has been made over the past few years particularly in the vital area of operational training for which no comparable effort exists outside the Agency. The magnitude of training activities is substantial though certainly not excessive. The results are generally acknowledged to justify the money and manpower invested by the Agency in this essential program.

2. From a more critical point of view certain significant weaknesses emerge which tend to blur the picture and retard the development of a more effective program. Perhaps the most significant of these is the lack of acceptance on the part of many command officers of their responsibility for the training of their subordinates. Training is a function of command the responsibility for which cannot be transferred to supporting or service elements. The OTR and other training units can provide centralized facilities, expert services and good administration but only the command echelons can set standards and levels of skill and competence and require their subordinates to meet them. In the Clandestine Service, most particularly, this has not been done. Uniform standards for operations officers (both headquarters and field) have not been established nor has officially approved doctrine been prescribed for

use in training courses. Training still is permissive and is subject frequently to the whims of individuals and lower echelon supervisors. Only those officers entering the Clandestine Service through the JOTP are sure to have fulfilled the operational training required and that is accomplished before they come under the administrative control of the DD/P.

3. Another significant weakness is the inadequacy of communication between using components and training units. Both OTR and Technical School, TSD, for example, have made repeated efforts to obtain evaluations of course content, quality and levels of instruction and appraisals of effectiveness but with little success. Critical comments solicited by the inspection team were freely given but upon further exploration it was found that such criticisms were seldom passed on to the training elements. Reporting from the field on the degree of competence displayed by officers of all categories is practically non-existent.

4. A third major weakness is the failure to closely relate training to career planning and management. The absence of long range career planning was observed in the IG's study of the Agency's Career Service Program and the knowledge gained in the course of this study serves to underscore the need for such planning. Without it a sound training program cannot be developed. Training is costly and the Agency can afford the investment only if it can be assured of an adequate return.

5. Finally, although there is a multitude of individual courses on most subjects required by the intelligence profession, they have not been molded into an integrated cohesive program that will ensure the proper preparation of Agency officers as they progress throughout their careers. The JOT program is a start in this direction but must be carried to its logical conclusion if it is to become the means of supplying the able competent officers the Agency so badly needs. The recommendations made in the preceding sections of this report, especially those pertaining to the JOT program will go far to strengthen the Agency's training effort.

B. Fundamental Principles of Training

1. As we have already noted there is no question about the Director's authority to expend federal funds for the training of Agency employees in the field of intelligence and we also have found that in the absence of any alternative it is necessary for such training to be conducted internally. Before proceeding to outline a training program projecting into the future certain fundamental principles of training should be examined.

2. Men learn by experience to which formal training is only an adjunct. Theoretically it would be possible to take a young man of average aptitudes and accomplishments and through a complex series of exposures to work experiences ultimately produce a seasoned, trained intelligence officer. By means of a well organized training program it can be done far better and in much shorter time. It requires, however, a coordinated effort on the part of command echelons to develop an integrated program and an adequately staffed and equipped vehicle for its implementation.

3. Training for the intelligence profession is analogous in some respects to that of other professions in its requirement for initial broad general preparation to be followed by advanced training in specialized fields. The young man who enters West Point, for example, spends four years acquiring the rudiments of Army military science to be graduated as a most junior officer into a specific branch of the service. Similarly physician and lawyer devote a major portion of their time to the broader aspects of their professions before specialization.

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And so it should be in the intelligence profession. The Agency's training program should adopt the principle of a comprehensive general education in all facets of intelligence work for all its professional employees before specific permanent assignments are made.

4. Learning is a continuous process whether it be in the form of knowledge gained through work experience or through formal training courses. Since learning is a matter of progression and growth it follows logically that the training program should be designed to accommodate this principle. Training should be phased to meet the needs of career development with an orderly progression through the various stages of the individual's service in the Agency.

5. Training also must have clearly defined objectives and such objectives should be formed in terms of the work for which the individual is being prepared. Standards of training should be related to the standards of performance the individual is expected to meet. No man should be assigned a job he is not prepared to perform and the satisfactory attainment of a training objective should be a required qualification for assignment.

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C. The Apprenticeship

1. General Preparatory Training

a. At this stage in the Agency's development there are two influencing factors which bear upon the future of training. The present professional staff has to a large degree taken existing training courses applicable to its functions or at least has acquired experience equivalent to such courses, and the JOT Program is evolving into the principal source of new employees in the professional ranks. As the proportion of JOT's rises and the training needs of the present staff are satisfied through existing courses the requirements for basic training for non-JOT's will vanish. Hence the opportunity is present to modify our present approach and establish a comprehensive integrated program which will serve for the years to come.

b. In designing such a program a distinction must be drawn between staff employees and all others. The staff employee category includes the great bulk of professional officers in headquarters and those overseas who man the Agency's regular installations.

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The program we are concerned with is devoted to the staff employee category.

c. Adhering to the fundamental principles of training the first step would appear to be the organizing of a comprehensive, general preparatory training course in intelligence work for all new professional employees. This course should cover all aspects of the intelligence

process including collection, production and support. Although specific skills training should not be injected at this early stage, the course should be more than a mere orientation. It should be a thorough indoctrination in the intelligence profession and would resemble the current 10-weeks phase of the JOTP. More time should be devoted to support activities than the two days now allotted in the JOT course and perhaps the overseas effectiveness course could be deferred to a later stage but the remaining subject matter should be retained. In addition general skills applicable to most of the Agency's functions should be included such as observation, elicitation, deduction, interpretation and reporting. These would contribute to evaluation as well as training.

d. Completion of the initial phase of general preparatory training will not qualify the trainee to immediately engage in productive work. Ideally for a well rounded education in intelligence a succession of work experiences in the three Deputy Directorates should take place at this point. Unfortunately the number of trainees involved would make this extremely difficult to administer and would impose an intolerable burden on the management of operating and support components called upon to provide such on-the-job training. It is possible however to devise a program of simulated work experience which would incorporate the pertinent functions of the intelligence process within a reasonable period of time.

e. This fundamental course should lay the foundation for advanced and specialized training but it should be sufficiently self-contained to stand by itself as a qualifying factor for a career in CIA. Completion of this phase should permit a coarse screening, a "wash out"

stage, which will identify and eliminate the obviously unfit. When this stage has been reached a tentative determination may be made of the vocation the individual should pursue throughout the major portion of his career. The duration of this elementary phase is difficult to fix without making a detailed analysis of subject matter and course content which is beyond the purview of this study but the present JOT experience would indicate that a maximum of six months would provide an adequate period of time for a well rounded course.

f. At this point the junior officer has received a thorough indoctrination in intelligence work and has been exposed to the workings of the various subdivisions of the Agency. He should now be ready to acquire the skills he will use for the major portion of his career. Those to be assigned to the Clandestine Service will go on to learn the trade-craft of espionage; others to learn intelligence research and analysis and the production of finished intelligence; and still others to take up the various functions of support. The duration of advanced training will vary according to the requirements and standards of the work to be performed but not until the entire training period has been satisfactorily completed should the trainee be released for permanent assignment. Less than satisfactory performance in basic training should be cause for termination automatically.

2. Skills Training

a. For the support services of the DD/S area skills training presents no unique problems. As we have noted earlier the major support components already have good training programs conducted internally and

augmented by the generous application of external training facilities. Furthermore many trainees destined for support work will bring with them certain basic skills already acquired before entering on duty with the Agency.

b. There is one area in which more can be done. The selection and training of general support officers, for which there is a growing demand, should be started at an earlier stage. This is more a matter of development than formalized training although there is ample room for a combination of both. The general support officer must have an intimate knowledge of all support services and also a comprehensive understanding of the intelligence activities he is to support. He must be a broad gauge individual with a capacity for absorbing the intricacies of the many faceted support functions and the ability to administer them effectively. He is a most important cog in the Agency's machinery who sometimes is not accorded the recognition he deserves. It takes a good deal of time to produce an able general support officer and there is a need for an organized program to develop the standards and requirements and provide the means to reach the objectives.

c. In the DD/I area advanced training problems also are relatively simple to resolve. The fundamental skills required are in research, collation, analysis and interpretation, and the preparation of finished intelligence reports. Certain courses already provided by OTR serve these purposes although some reservations as to quality and level of instruction were found among consumers. It was also noted however that the OTR training effort did not receive a full measure of support from

the DD/I area particularly in establishing standards related to job requirements, the development of doctrine and in providing the services of qualified instructors. Needless to say full cooperation on both sides is necessary if effective results are to be obtained.

d. The diversification of functions in the DD/I area will produce requirements for advanced training beyond those specified above. The information gathering functions of the Office of Operations, for example, would require additional training in the basic skills involved as would the information storage and retrieval functions of OCR.

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D. Mid-career Training

1. The need for some form of training at the middle career level is acknowledged by trainers and consumers alike but there is little agreement on the nature, extent or even timing of such a course. Mid-career training generally throughout government and industry is accepted as a part of an overall program of the proper preparation of people to perform effectively in their assigned functions. The Foreign Service Institute, for example, offers a course for Foreign Service Officers at the FSO 3, 4, and 5 levels which is designed to "encourage the development of a broad and integrated professional philosophy that will enable the officer to function with a more acute awareness and a deeper understanding of the essential character and role of his profession." (It should be noted that the 12 week course includes two weeks devoted to executive management.) While this purpose may not be completely appropriate to the Agency, it does contain some of the essential characteristics applicable to any program of training at mid-career.

2. Before advancing suggestions for the purpose and nature of such training a definition of mid-career should be agreed upon. The middle point of a man's career will, of course, vary with the individual and will be influenced by circumstances both favorable and unfavorable. An age and grade projection of what may be considered an average career would take this form:

GS Grade	9	11	12	13	14	15
Age	25	30	35	40	45	50

In actual practice intervals between promotions in the lower grades may be shorter and longer in the upper grades. While this projection admittedly is rather arbitrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the young man of 25

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entering the service should aspire to grade GS-15 by the time he reaches 50 years of age. If he does not his chances of attaining that grade thereafter diminish rapidly. We realize that 25 years of service is not regarded by many as a full lifetime career and that GS-15 is not the full limit of grade levels available. The projection may be extended through GS-18 and age 65 without materially altering the relationship of age and grade. The number of supergrade positions always will be limited and since we are seeking something having application to the majority of officers we believe it more practical to use the projection shown above.

3. The middle point in grade falls between GS-12 and 13, in age between 35 and 40, and in length of service between 10 and 15 years. This point appears to be most appropriate for a number of reasons. At the GS-13 level an officer usually is expected to assume major supervisory responsibilities for which he should be thoroughly prepared. One of the deficiencies noted in the current training effort is the inadequacy of proper preparation of employees assigned managerial responsibilities. Grade GS-13 also is in many areas of the Agency a crucial point; it is a "break-through" level which distinguishes between journeymen and senior officers. It is in effect the gateway to more senior positions and one of the more difficult to penetrate.

4. The age bracket of 35 to 40 also is very significant. It is the stage at which the individual becomes more mature, he is more aware of the full extent of his responsibilities both at work and at home and his concern with his future is greatly sharpened. It is no coincidence that the average age of professional officers in grade GS-12 and over who leave the Agency for some other occupation is 39.4. It is frequently a turning point in a man's life.

5. In terms of years of service this middle point is most appropriate also. The officer has served his apprenticeship and at least seven to twelve productive years in his specialty. He probably knows all there is to know about his job but has had little opportunity to participate in or learn about other activities. The danger of atrophy is greatest at this point.

6. A mid-career training program designed with these factors in mind should have as its purpose: (a) to prepare officers to assume broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command; (b) to refresh and rekindle their motivation in the interest of the government and the intelligence service, and (c) to broaden their outlook of the Agency's mission through a better understanding of the interrelationships of its many parts.

7. We anticipate some initial difficulties in the development and scheduling of a mid-career program but as employees' promotion and growth rate stabilizes there should be a fairly uniform progression of officers through this mid-career stage which will provide standard, almost routine attendance for a regularly scheduled course. The seminar form of approximately 12 weeks is favored by most and would appear to be appropriate to the purpose.

It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions.

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E. Senior Officer Training

1. One of the readily identifiable problem areas in the Agency today is the pronounced shortage of senior level officers thoroughly experienced in all aspects of the intelligence profession capable of understanding and effectively dealing with complex Agency-wide and inter-agency problems. The Agency finds itself in this circumstance partly through its historical evolution in which some components descended in unbroken line from World War II organizations; partly because the organizational structure has fostered the growth of three semi-autonomous sub-divisions; partly because a sound security concept of compartmentation has been permitted to develop into a policy approaching "apartheid"; and partly because the pressure of operational and functional demands placed on the Agency since its inception have compelled the direction of its great energy to the rapid development of people to do specific jobs well and defer to some later date the development of people who can do all jobs well. There also enters here some element of the prodigal use of talent because it is plentiful, the substitution of numbers of people to make up for lack of broad individual competence and the resorting to group judgments in place of executive skill.

2. Preparing individuals to assume and effectively discharge the responsibilities of senior management is more a problem of development than formalized training although the latter has a definite place in the scheme of things. As we pointed out in the Inspector General's report on the Career Service Program, the absence of an organized method of career development has seriously hampered the proper preparation of officers for key positions and some sound long range planning must be instituted to meet this need. We

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still are hopeful that such an effort will be successful in the near future. For the present, however, there is an immediate need to do everything possible to improve the effectiveness of today's staff of senior officers and those to be selected in the next few years to come. For this purpose we suggest a senior officer training program.

3. The objective of a senior officer program may be briefly stated in these terms: to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government. This objective is sufficiently broad to encompass all aspects of the intelligence profession, the internal management of Agency affairs and the interrelationships of the Agency with the intelligence community and the policy making elements of the government.

4. The level at which this program is aimed should not be lower than GS-15 although a case can be made to include selected individuals at the GS-14 level. It should be regarded as the preparatory phase for officers entering the final stages of their careers with the Agency and therefore provide a rounding out of their earlier experiences and training.

5. The greatest benefit of this program is to be derived from the interchange of opinions and ideas through the exploration of the entire spectrum of Agency and community problems. For this purpose a combination of seminars and case studies with a minimum of orientational lecturing would be the most productive. A mixed enrollment of DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S officers could profit by exposure to each other's problems. A budget officer, for example, might make a solid contribution to a discussion of counterintelligence operations, a case officer might speak with conviction on information storage

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and retrieval, and an analyst may offer valuable ideas on logistical matters. Executive management should be stressed at this level but no subject, operational or administrative, should be neglected.

6. A senior officer program to be most effective must be allotted a period of time adequate to the full development of its objective. A similar program, though on a somewhat broader scale, conducted by the Foreign Service Institute runs for nine months. We do not contemplate so extensive a program to meet Agency needs at the present time. As the program evolves in the future it may be found desirable to invite attendance by senior officers of other intelligence agencies in which event a longer course might be justified. For the initial effort at least and until experience can be gained we believe a course of about four months would be most effective.

7. In magnitude, taking into account the problems of administration and technical methods of handling such a program, it is suggested that enrollment be limited to not more than 40 officers at one time. The program should be conducted at least twice annually although it is believed possible to run two courses concurrently if necessary. A reasonable goal would appear to be the participation of 80 to 100 officers each year.*

*Note: At the present rate of promotion about 50 officers will enter the GS-15 level each year. It is anticipated that promotions will stabilize at this rate for the foreseeable future. This will permit ultimately scheduling the senior officer program semiannually with an attendance of about 25 at each session. For the first few years, however, the effort must be made to accommodate a large part of the present staff as well as the newly elevated officers.

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10. Other than the salaries of the participants no extraordinary cost is contemplated for this program. It should be administered by the DTR who will be expected to provide supporting services. In the initial formulation of the program the services of technical experts will be needed but instructors as such can be dispensed with. Seminar and discussion leaders can be drawn from the Agency at large or, better still, from among the participating officers themselves. None of the customary testing and evaluation practices are called for. It may be desirable to enlist and pay for some expert outside talent to handle such subjects as advanced management but the cost for such services would be modest when compared with the cost of full-time instructors.

11. On a number of occasions in the past suggestions have been made to establish an Intelligence Staff College along the lines of similar military institutions. Some such proposals have been reviewed in the process of this study and much thought has been given the matter. There is much to be said in favor of some form of staff college for intelligence officers but it is believed that the Agency is not yet ready for such an undertaking. A senior officers' program as outlined herein may well lead to the ultimate establishment of a broader and higher level school but to meet the Agency's most urgent need this program should be developed without delay.

It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described above.

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To summarize our views on the future of training in this Agency we advocate first, that the JOT system of recruitment, selection and training be adapted to meet all junior officer requirements throughout the Agency (about 250 annually at present); secondly, that an organized program of required training be instituted phased to coincide with and supplement professional career development and growth. The pattern we envision is one of annual classes of junior officers having the essential qualifications of background and motivation for intelligence work following an orderly progression of general preparation by means of comprehensive indoctrination and training in the basic skills of the profession; then the period of specialized training to prepare for the productive years to follow. The pattern is filled out by a mid-career training phase for selected officers ready to assume broader responsibilities and finally by a form of "terminal training" to develop the Agency's executives.

This pattern if followed will meet the bulk of the Agency's personnel requirements and will substantially raise the level of professional competence in every field. It is necessarily based on certain assumptions. It is assumed for example that command echelons will accept fully their responsibility for the proper preparation of the employees of their commands to do the jobs expected of them; that they will establish rigorous training and job standards and insist that they be met; that they will produce the authoritative doctrine essential to their training needs; and that they will require the necessary long range personnel planning so essential to any training program. It is also assumed that the Director of Training and heads of training elements will continue to strive for greater competence in instructors, better training techniques and facilities and more skillful administration.

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In conclusion we would like to reiterate that the success of the Agency depends in large measure on the success of its training and development program. In the intelligence field there is no room for failure.

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**INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CIA TRAINING PROGRAM
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